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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Sixth Amendent * Right to Counsel e
Use of Prior Uncounseled Convictions
Lewis v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980)
&
Baldasar v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 1585 (1980)
O NCE AGAIN the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of the right to
counsel. Within three months the Court rendered two decisions which
appear to be inconsistent, not only with one another, but with prior decisions
of the Court.
The Court in Lewis v. United States," a six to three decision, held that
a violation of section 1202(a)(1) of The Gun Control Act of 19682 can
be predicated upon an invalid, uncounseled prior conviction. Section 1202
(a) (1) provides that any person who has been convicted of a felony and
who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce any firearm shali be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.'
In 1961 petitioner Lewis plead guilty to a charge of breaking and
entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony in the State
of Florida." Petitioner was not represented by counsel at these proceedings.
Sixteen years later Lewis was arrested and indicted for possessing
a firearm in violation of 1202(a) (1).5 At no time prior to being charged
under 1202(a) (1) did the petitioner attack his prior felony conviction
as invalid. Neither did the petitioner attempt to have the disability removed
as provided for in section 1203(2)1 and section 925(c).7 Counsel for peti-
tioner informed the court that petitioner had not been represented by counsel
in the earlier Florida proceedings and alleged that this violated the holding
of Gideon v. Wainwright.' Counsel offered to provide evidence that would
substantiate this fact and to introduce further evidence that the petitioner
1 100 S. Ct. 915 (1980).
2 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976).
a id.
4 FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (repealed 1974).
3 100 S. Ct. at 917.
6 18 U.S.C. app. § 1203(2) (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1976).
'372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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had been entitled to appointed counsel at the time, since he was indigent.'
The court refused to admit this evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant
to the question of whether petitioner had violated section 1202(a) (1).
The court found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to eighteen months
imprisonment for the federal firearm violation.'
In a three to two decision the Fourth Circuit affirmed petitioner's con-
viction. 1 The majority held that Lewis could not defend against the gun
possession charge by claiming for the first time that the prior conviction
was invalid because he had been denied counsel. The majority felt that
Congress intended to keep weapons out of the hands of the status class of
convicted felons." Further, the court rejected Lewis' argument that the
prior uncounseled conviction was void for any purpose." The court stated:
We think that Congress is entitled to rely on a prior standing con-
viction as proof that there is probable cause to believe the convicted per-
son has been involved in criminal activity and should not be able to
buy a gun without first showing that he is no threat to public safety,
even though the conviction may have been obtained in violation of
Gideon."4
The court expressed a concern over the burden that would be placed
upon trial courts if time-consuming collateral attacks of this nature
were permitted. "[T]he government would have to demonstrate the con-
stitutional validity of outstanding convictions--at whenever a defendant so
insists. Yet, there is no evidence that Congress intended this type of pro-
cedure -- a 'trial-within-a-trial'...."15
In concluding the court acknowledged that other courts had reached
contrary views, but they firmly believed that Congress had the constitutional
power, in the interest of public safety, to prohibit any person subject to an
outstanding facially valid felony conviction from possessing and receiving
firearms."
Judge Winter, writing in dissent, argued that section 1202(a) (I)
did not place an affirmative burden on a defendant to have his invalid con-
viction overturned. He also argued that the denial of counsel in the prior
proceeding was a violation of Lewis' constitutional rights."" This invalid
9 100 S. Ct. at 917.
10 Petitioner's Brief App. at 11, 12.
"I United States v. Lewis, 591 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1979).
121d. at 979.
13 Id. at 980.
Id. at 981 (quoting United States v. Allen, 556 F.2d 720, 724 (4th Cir. 1977)).
15Id. at 981 (quoting United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 83 (3rd Cir. 1977)).
I d.
"7 Id. at 982,
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conviction was a necessary predicate to a determination of guilt, a result
not likely intended by Congress.18 Judge Winter found the majority holding
in violation of the mandate of Burgett v. Texas, 9 which forbids the use of
a prior uncounseled conviction to enhance punishment under a recidivist
statute.2 " He noted that Burgett does not require the defendant to seek post-
conviction relief before collaterally attacking his conviction.2' Since the
record clearly shows the denial of counsel, the burden on all the parties in-
volved would be minimal.2 According to Judge Winter, "[N]either reason
nor authority supports a rule that one previously convicted of a felony in
violation of his sixth amendment right cannot assert the invalidity of that
conviction as a defense to a prosecution under § 1202(a). '"2"
This Fourth Circuit decision was the first to hold that an uncounseled
conviction could be used as a basis for a conviction under section 1202
(a) (1). The Supreme Court granted centiorari to resolve the conflict among
the circuits.
The Court, with Justice Blackmun writing for the majority, relies on
two major premises: (1) the statutory language of 1202(a) (1) is plain
and unambiguous, and (2) the classification created by the legislature bears
a rational relationship to the purpose for which it was enacted.2"
"The statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the
fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction
is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action
... 9,25 The Court notes that section 1203 enumerates exceptions to
1202(a) (1), but there is no exception for one whose prior conviction is
found to be invalid. 6
The majority finds further support in the legislative history of the
Act. The legislation was enacted in response to the growing number of po-
litical assassinations and violent crimes involving the use of firearms.2"
28Id. at 983.
19389 U.S. 109 (1967). Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment which was read
to the jury. The first count charged him with assault. The remaining counts charged him
with violation of the Texas recidivist statute, alleging prior felony convictions. Defendant
was found guilty of assault and could have been sentenced to life imprisonment. Counsel
objected to introduction of evidence of these convictions on the grounds that defendant had
not been represented by counsel.
201d. at 115.
21 591 F.2d at 984.
221d. at 985.
2Sd.
24 100 S. Ct. at 918-21.
2 5 1d. at 918.
26 18 U.S.C. app. § 1203 (1976).
27 100 S. Ct. at 919.
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Senator Russel Long, the sponsor of the bill, emphasized that a violation of
section 1202(a) (1) is triggered by a conviction, and the disability remains
in place until it has been removed through proper procedures."8
The Court concludes that "section 1202(a) was a sweeping prophylaxis
, against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to
require the Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction."2
Section 1203(2)30 and section 925(c) 2 provide two methods for
removing the disability. The Court notes a third method: the petitioner
could have challenged his prior conviction in state court.
Lewis contended that the statute should be construed so as to avoid
a constitutional issue. The majority felt that the language and history of
the statute are so clear that no alternative construction was possible.32
The Court's second major rationale focuses on the relationship be-
tween the classification created - convicted felons - and the purpose of
the legislation - to keep firearms out of the possession of those thought
most likely to use them in the commission of crime. The Court concludes
that Congress had a rational basis for the classification. Any felony con-
viction, even an allegedly invalid one is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit
the possession of a firearm.3
Conceding that an uncounseled conviction cannot be used for certain
purposes, the Court summarily disposes of the argument that Burgett pre-
cludes the use of petitioner's uncounseled conviction to support the section
1202(a)(1) violation. " The majority notes that the focus of the federal
gun laws is premised upon the "mere fact of conviction"; the disability at-
taches immediately upon conviction. 3 This is essentially a civil disability
enforced through a criminal sanction. Petitioner is not precluded from
seeking relief from an invalid conviction, but merely precluded from at-
tacking it collaterally by way of a firearm prosecution. 8
The dissenters, led by Justice Brennan, disagree with the majority's
characterization of the statute as plain and unambiguous." They examined
28 Id.
29 Id. at 920.
30 18 U.S.C. app. § 1203(2) (1976).
81 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1976).
32 100 S. Ct. at 920.
331d. at 921.
34 id.
35 d.
38 d. at 922.
B? Md.
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the alternative constructions offered by the parties: "The first is the Gov-
ernment's - that § 1202 (a) (1) may be read to permit only out-
standing felony convictions to serve as a basis for prosecution. The second
is petitioner's - that the predicate conviction must not only be outstand-
ing, but also constitutionally valid."38 Where one construction of the statute
would result in a harsh penalty, the principle of lenity requires the statute
be construed so as to avoid that result. Applying that principle in the in-
stant case, the statute should apply only to those constitutionally con-
victed. The dissent finds nothing in the legislative history that would
indicate a contrary congressional intent. "
A second principle of statutory construction is that if there is a question
of constitutionality, the Court should first determine whether there is a
construction of the statute by which that issue may be avoided. Justice
Brennan concludes that reading section 1202 (a) so as to predicate criminal
liability solely on the existence of a previous uncounseled felony conviction
raises serious constitutional questions. Burgett clearly controls in this case.
Uncounseled felony convictions can never be used to support guilt or en-
hance punishment for another offense. Without the petitioner's prior con-
viction, there could be no conviction for a violation of section 1202(a) (1).'1
The dissent finds that "it is simply irrevelant that petitioner could
have challenged the validity of his prior conviction in appropriate pro-
ceedings in the state courts . . . neither Burgett nor Loper imposed any
requirement that a defendant collaterally attack his uncounseled convictions
before he faces prosecution under § 1202(a) (1). .. .
For the first time since Gideon v. Wainwright,"3 the Court appears to
have turned its back on the importance of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The continuous emphasis on the importance of this constitutional
right has been subordinated to a construction of section 1202(a) that
arguably renders the statute itself unconstitutional.
The Court dismisses in a preemptory manner petitioner's arguments
based on the Court's own decisions in Burgett, United States v. Tucker,"
and Loper v. Beto." The paradoxical result of the Court's decision in Lewis
is that if the petitioner had been charged and convicted of anything other
8Id. at 923.
3Id.
'
0 Id. at 924.
41 d. -.
42 Id. at 925.
43 372 U.S. at 335.
"404 U.S. 443 (1972).
'6405 U.S. 473 (1972).
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than a violation of a federal firearms statute, the prior uncounseled con-
viction could not have been used to enhance his punishment or impeach
his testimony. Yet in this case, not only had Lewis been invalidly con-
victed in the first place, he would not have been in violation of section
1202 (a) (1) but for that conviction. The Court's decision mandates this
ironic and illogical result.
The Court exhibits an unusual deference to the Congress by permitting
a reading of the statute that effectively denies the petitioner his sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights. The dissent also avoids what should be the
central issue of this case, the plight of the petitioner as a result of the
violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Instead, both the
majority and the dissent focus on the statutory language. The petitioner's
rights.were violated once in 1961. That violation is compounded by the
majority's broad reading of section 1202(a). This reading includes within
the statute's reach anyone convicted, validly or invalidly, of a felony. It
is. neither illogical nor unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to
include only those validly convicted. Clearly it would be unconstitutional
for Congress to have specifically included within the statutory language
those who have been subject to invalid convictions by reason of denial of
counsel. Yet the Court writes into case law what Congress could not con-
stitutionally accomplish.
It is interesting to note the way in which the petitioner, the government,
and the Court phrased the issue in this case. Petitioner phrased the ques-
tion as follows:
Whether a conviction in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright ... may be
used to support a subsequent conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1202
(a) (1). "
The government chose a much broader phrasing of the issue:
Whether a defendant who is a previously convicted felon may chal-
lenge the constitutionality of his prior conviction as a defense to a
prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm."
The Court presented the question in the following manner:
[W]hether a defendant's extant prior conviction, flawed because he
was without counsel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright . . . may
constitute the predicate for a subsequent conviction under § -1202
(a)(1) . 48
The Court chose to phrase the issue in the narrow form. By so doing
46 Petitioner's Brief at 2.
47 Respondent's Brief at 2.
48 100 S. Ct. at 916.
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they could have easily limited their decision so as to include only a serious
violation of a defendant's rights, one that rises to constitutional magnitude,
such as denial of right to counsel. The Court's ruling, however, is not
directed to questioning a conviction obtained in violation of defendant's
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights, but to gleaning the Congressional in-
tent and to establishing the existence of a rational basis for the legislation. The
Court chose to ignore its many rulings on the right to counsel and has estab-
lished a special standard by which the government can constitutionally deny a
defendant the right to counsel. It is difficult to reconcile this decision with the
Court's own precedent. The Court ignored these inconsistencies and adopted
the government's position. An analysis of this case raises many questions,
but provides few answers.
Two months later, the Court further confused the issue in Baldasar v.
Illinois."5 In a per curiam decision the Court held that an uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction cannot be used under an enhanced penalty statute
to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony carrying a prison
term.5" The decision appears to be consistent with the Court's holdings in
Argersinger v. Hamlin51 and Scott v. Illinois52 and inconsistent with the
Court's holding in Lewis.
In 1975 the petitioner was charged with petty theft, a misdemeanor.
He was not represented by counsel. Petitioner was fined and sentenced
to one year's probation. Six months later, the petitioner was again arrested
and charged with another petty theft. Over the objection of counsel, evi-
dence was introduced at trial that petitioner had a prior misdemeanor
conviction.53 The prosecution successfully argued that petitioner be pun-
ished under the Illinois enhancement statute5 ' which converts a second
misdemeanor theft conviction into a felony. Petitioner was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of one to three years under the enhancement statute.
The Illinois Appellate Court upheld appellant Baldasar's conviction.
Justice Nash, writing for the majority, relied upon Argersinger and con-
cluded that there was nothing in the language of that case "suggesting a
prospective application or readjudication of a defendant's right to counsel
should he be convicted in the future of the commission of another offense
and be then subject to another sentence."55
49 I00 S. Ct. 1585 (1980).
50 Id.
51407 U.S. 25 (1972).
52440 U.S. 367 (1979).
53 100 S. Ct. at 1586.
64 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 16-1(e)(1) (1973).
'5 People v. Baldasar, 52 Il1. App. 3d 305, 307, 367 N.E. 2d 459, 461-62 (1977).
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The court held that Argersinger was limited in scope, prohibiting
imprisonment only for the specific uncounseled misdemeanor; an un-
counseled conviction might properly be used if the petitioner were con-
victed in a future proceeding based upon subsequent conduct."
The dissent did not dispute the validity of petitioner's conviction
under the A rgersinger rationale. However, Justice Rechenmacher disagreed
with the majority's limiting Argersinger to a conviction and the sentence
imposed for that conviction. He noted that as a consequence of appellant's
prior conviction, the potential result was two extra years of imprisonment."
He distinguished this result from one in which a prior uncounseled con-
viction was used for the purpose of impeachment:
[W]here the misdemeanor was introduced for impeachment purposes,
the link between the prior conviction and the defendant's imprison-
ment was quite remote, or even speculative .... Clearly, in the in-
stant case, imprisonment is a far more direct consequence of the
use of the earlier conviction .... 58
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, joined
by Justices Brennan and Stevens, filed a concurring opinion holding that
under Scott "no indigent criminal defendant [may] be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment unless the state afforded him the right to assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense."59 Petitioner's sentence violated this rule.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, wrote
a concurring opinion supporting a reversal of petitioner's conviction based
upon the Court's holding in Gideon.' He noted that while Argersinger
limited the constitutional right to counsel where the offense charged was
a misdemeanor, and Scott further defined those limits, in the instant case the
petitioner's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction had been used
collaterally to impose a term of imprisonment."1 It is clear that had it not
been for the petitioner's prior conviction, his sentence could have been
for no more than one year."
The Court agreed that petitioner's prior conviction was valid for
some purposes, but not for the purpose of increasing his imprisonment
under a repeat offender statute."3
56Id. at 310.
57ld. at 312.
58 Id. at 313.
5 100 S. Ct. at 1586 (quoting Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74).
Go ld. at 1587.
61 Id.
62 d.
Id. at 1588.
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In yet another concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun reiterated his
"bright line" approach of Scott: an indigent would have counsel appointed
whenever the petty offense was punishable by more than six month's im-
prisonment.64 Problems such as Baldasar's would never arise under such
an approach.
The dissent, led by Justice Powell, distinguished Scott from the in-
stant case by emphasizing that the petitioner's prior conviction was constitu-
tionally valid and that the majority's holding now makes that conviction
invalid if used as the predicate for enhancing petitioner's sentence."'
Trial courts will now be subjected to the additional burden of predicting
whether a defendant will repeat his offense. The increased cost, delay,
and confusion that will result will frustrate state policies of deterring
repeat criminal offenders. The dissent laments not only this confusion, but
the lack of effective guidelines by which courts may administer justice in
misdemeanor cases.6"
Justice Powell writes in a footnote that the decision in Baldasar is all the
more puzzling in view of the Court's decision in Lewis. Justice Powell finds
that "The conflict between the holdings could scarcely be more violent.",
It is interesting to note that the majority in Baldasar, with the exception
of Justice Stewart, made up the dissent in Scott. Clearly, this majority
has not adopted the rationale of Scott, but bound by precedent, held that
Baldasar follows in a logical progression a line of cases that protect a
defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel.
Justice Powell, writing in dissent, expressed his concern that this
decision will incite further litigation and interfere with the administration
of justice.68 It would appear that his fears are justified. The prosecution,
in order to preserve its options, will ask that the court appoint counsel in
most, if not all, misdemeanor cases. The dissent in Scott will become
the rule that trial courts will necessarily follow, a defendant will be en-
titled to appointed counsel in all cases where any imprisonment is au-
thorized. Justice Powell suggests that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
cannot be used for impeachment or for later sentencing determinations.69
64 Id. at 1589.
65Id. at 1590.
eI Id. at 1590-91.
e7 Id. at 1592 n.3.
as ld. at 1590.
69 Id. at 1592.
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A situation more likely to give the Court problems is that of the un-
counseled defendant who is given probation and who then violates some
provision of that probation such as associating with known criminals or
failing to report to a probation officer. A reading of Baldasar indicates that
a trial court is precluded from revoking the defendant's probation and im-
posing a prison sentence. Unquestionably, the Court will have to face
this issue in the future.
There seems to be no reasonable way in which to reconcile the Court's
holdings in Lewis and Baldasar. Lewis involved an invalid conviction. That
conviction, according to the Court's prior decisions, could not be used to im-
peach the defendant's testimony, enhance his punishment under a recidivist
statute, or affect his sentence. No one has suggested that the defendant in
Lewis either had counsel or that he knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel. Further, no one has suggested that the defendant was not en-
titled to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Yet the Supreme
Court, by focusing on statutory language and construction, held that this
undisputedly invalid conviction, could be used as a predicate to a con-
viction under a federal gun control law that resulted in a prison sentence
of eighteen months."0
Compare this to Baldasar which involved a valid misdemeanor con-
viction. No one will disagree as to the validity of the defendant's conviction
under the rationale of Argersinger and Scott. Even the defendant did not
question the validity of his conviction nor argue that he was entitled to
appointed counsel. Yet the Court finds that this valid conviction is invalid
for the purpose of imposing an increased term of imprisonment for a
second offense under a repeat offender statute.
In both cases the Court speaks of burdens on the trial courts in
making the necessary determinations. Yet the facts of the two cases would
indicate that the Court could easily have arrived at different results. In
Lewis it is clear from the record that the defendant had been entitled to
counsel under Gideon. Administratively, there would be little or no burden
in terms of cost or delay in making this determination.
As a result of the holding in Baldasar, the trial court is now required
prior to trial, not only to make a determination as to whether or not a
prison sentence will be imposed for a misdemeanor, but also whether
or not they believe that this particular defendant is likely to commit a
second misdemeanor for which an enhanced prison term may be imposed.
It would appear that the Court requires judges to bring their crystal balls
to the bench whenever a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor which
70 100 S. Ct. at 923-24.
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if repeated will convert that misdemeanor into a felony and additional
imprisonment. The time, cost, and confusion involved will be immeasurable.
In Lewis, both the majority and the dissent concentrate their reasoning
on the language and construction of the statute under which the petitioner
was convicted. Few words are expended on behalf of the defendant's sixth
and fourteenth amendment rights, rights clearly violated by his prior un-
counseled conviction. By contrast the focus in Baldasar is squarely upon
the right to counsel where a term of imprisonment is imposed. The choice
of focus seems to have predetermined the Court's result in each of these
cases.
One could more easily understand the reverse results in the two cases.
Petitioner Baldasar had a trial without counsel on a misdemeanor charge.
He received a fine and probation. A prison term was imposed only after
he had repeated the misdemeanor offense. One can make the assumption
that the court, upon granting probation, made clear to the defendant that
a subsequent offense and conviction would subject him to a prison term.
Petitioner Lewis, on the other hand, pleaded guilty. When that is the case:
Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is
doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison,
and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
7 1
Since reliable convictions and fundamental fairness in the trial process
are basic to our criminal justice system the Court should have reversed Lewis
and, at the very least, granted a new trial with counsel. Such a decision would
have been consistent with Baldasar and would have maintained the Court's
previously unfailing adherence to the importance of the right to counsel
in felony cases.
The message the Court has sent to trial courts, defendants, and prose-
cutors is unclear. The issue of right to counsel and its many ramifications
will continue to be argued for the foreseeable future. The Court will con-
tinue to struggle with the collateral effects of uncounseled convictions. At
some point, the Court will be forced to reconcile the conflicting holdings
of Baldasar and Lewis. The resolution of that confrontation will have an
important impact on the administration of criminal justice.
RITA MARKS
71 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 34.
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